Afghanistan`s Government Future Abstract

Afghanistan`s Government Future Abstract

Afghanistan`sGovernment Future

Abstract

TheAfghanistan War is the longest military confrontation that the UnitedStates has ever undertaken. In 2009, President Barack Obama claimedthat the United States was forced to enter into the war so that itcan protect its citizens. The U.S intended to defeat the Taliban andAl-Qaeda groups since they were furthering extremism ideologies. Itintended to accomplish the objective with the help of militaryintervention. Nevertheless, the objective still seems farfetched overfifteen years later. The objective of this research would be toinvestigate the possibility of the Afghani government could maintainthe state secure after the international military leaves the country(Javaidand Farhat 2013, 312).The study will use qualitative analysis approach to determine theprobability of Afghanistan staying politically secure. The findingsindicate that the Afghanistan Army is still unprepared to suppressthe ISIS, Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgents that are infiltrating thecountry. Consequently, the transition government will soon collapseand the Taliban will take over leadership, just as it happened afterthe Soviet Army withdrew in 1989.

Afghanistanhas a long history of insecurity. In the 1970s, the United Statesbacked Mujahideen insurgents to combat the Soviet Army that hasinvaded the country. It accomplished the objective through provisionof military training, financial support and weapon supply. Although,The U.S never engaged in direct confrontation with the Soviet, one ofits greatest economic rivals, it celebrated the USSR withdrawal fromAfghanistan. Unfortunately, the joy was short-lived because theMujahideen began power-struggle in the 1990s. Soon, the conflictescalated into conflict that threatened the entire Middle-Eastregion. The Taliban insurgents, backed by the Al-Qaeda managed toestablish a military regime in the country. While the U.S and theworld allowed the Taliban groups to thrive, it gradually turned intoa terrorist group, with the peak of its extremism leading to 9/11attacks that catapulted the U.S and its Western allies to launch amilitary intervention for curbing Taliban terrorism in 2009. Besides,it aimed to establish a democratic government that would help tosuppress extremism and continued radicalization. Finally, the westernallies announced that its military expedition in the country was overin 2014. It passed the governorship of the country to the NationalUnity Government. So far, the administration trend indicates that theAfghan National Security Forces including Afghan Armed Forces (ANA),Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), AfghanLocal Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS)cannot provide the necessary security for the population and survivalof the central government.

Literaturereview

Accordingto Javaid and Farhat (2013, 312), the departure of the foreign troopswill allow attract the foreign fighters into the country.Subsequently, the transition regime will collapse. The former TalibanArmy will also regroup quickly and establish a strong insurgence thatwills easily allow it to conquer Afghanistan. Finally, the resourcenotes that increased instability will finally lead into a gruelingcivil fight between the government troops and the rebels. Waldman(2013) echoes similar sentiments that the Afghan Security forces lackthe capacity to protect both the citizens and the central government.He admits that the United States’ military intervention in 2001 hasfacilitated development in some key sectors, but the Taliban forcesare still strong. Nevertheless, the exit of foreign forces canguarantee no long-term stability since the disbanded fighters willlikely come back to reclaim their former throne (Waldman 2013,832-836). Storch (2015) points out the increased suicide attacks inAfghanistan by bombers affiliated to the Islamic State is a warningthe Afghan Armed Forces will be even more vulnerable when the foreignforces withdraw. Furthermore, the majority of the people in the armedforces are former Taliban officials who have been incorporated in thegovernment. As such, they will most likely change loyalty, andestablish insurgency that will overthrow the unity government. Theresearcher uses critical analysis of the events that followed in 1989withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The unstable political environmentprovided a suitable base for terrorist groups to thrive. Once theforeign forces move out of the nation, similar chaos will follow, andthe insurgents will easily overthrow the present coalition government(Storch 2015). Grassi (2015) notes that the present Afghaniadministration is a coalition government. He uses case studies of aprevious coalition government in other states to conclude that suchgovernment systems are rarely successful. On the same note, thecountry lacks adequate resources to sustain its government. Theeconomy growth is weak, and the natural resources remain extensivelyunexploited. Since it has no potential strategy to pay its armedforces, the armies will most likely disband as soon as foreignassistance ceases. On the long run, different insurgents will come upand begin fighting for the limited resources, and the conflict willescalate into a civil war that the government cannot restrain (Grassi2014).

Felbab-Brown(2015) uses a qualitative analysis method to review the presentsecurity threats facing Afghanistan such as Al-Qaeda and Talibangroups, as well as its affiliated insurgents such as Hezeb-el-Islami,Haqqani and ISIS, are still vibrant in the region. Therefore, theweak Afghani forces will be overthrown within a short time after theinternational troops withdraw (Felbab-Brown 2015). In a nationalbroadcast interview, Amrullah Saleh asserted that the Afghani armedforces have the capacity to protect its citizens since Pakistan hasenhanced its support for the Taliban. Secondly, the country isalready politically divided after the prolonged standoff thatresulted from the previously contested elections. The National UnityGovernment is extremely volatile, and a little disagreement among theprincipals will lead to exacerbating insurgency fighting.

Practically,extensive research studies indicate that the Afghanistan armed forcesare propped on the foreign firepower. However, this approach isbiased because the NATO troops have gradually trained and transferredthe military responsibility to Afghani armed forces over a longperiod. Khalilzad (2015) asserts that the National Security Forcesincluding Afghan Armed Forces (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP),Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Local Police (ALP) and theNational Directorate of Security (NDS) have been trained adequatelyto handle the country’s security matters. Therefore, the myth thatthe military lacks the power and intelligence to handle securitymatters without NATO assistance holds no water.

Insummary, if the security forces will fail to deliver its mandate, thedisappointment will result from internal management wranglesassociated with the Government of National Unity. Afghanistan may notbe a wealthy country, and withdraw of the US military, and financialassistance will deny the people some services they have presently,but the withdrawal does not have an adequate impact on causesinstability. The foreign military process has strategized thewithdrawal process in a way that that will ensure the local militaryhas adequate experience to run the country. In fact, the process wasaccomplished within four years, which is enough period to prepare thelocal troops.

TheoreticalFramework/Approach

Thisstudy will aim to fill the information gap concerning the militarypower of the Afghan Army. Some critics claim it cannot withstand thefirepower of the insurgents associated with the terrorist groups.Using qualitative analysis of the most recent Afghanistan data, thestudy will seek to establish whether the InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF)has adequately trained the Afghani armed forces adequately to combatthe extremists (Center for Army Lessons Learned 141).

Theanalysis of the Afghanistan’s future government will be determinedthrough five key considerations:

  1. Comprehend the country’s security status from a stability-focused viewpoint

  2. The primary dedication of the local population and its goals to achieve long-term stability

  3. Establish the critical causes of insecurity in the country as well as possible methods to suppress the threats

  4. Availability of activities or programs that are focused on addressing the known insecurity causes

  5. Finally, the theory will track and asses the outputs of specific activities and their community influence, including changes that are achievable after acquiring wholesome stability (Center for Army Lessons Learned 145).

Onceall the entire data necessary to acquire situational awareness isavailable, the researcher will use qualitative techniques to identifythe major sources of insecurity (SOIs) in the country and thereadiness of the Afghani armed forces possibility of suppressing theproblem. The situational awareness and the possibility to fight backthe SOIs effectively will determine if the Afghan National SecurityForces can protect the both the citizens and the central governmentafter the ISAF withdraws from the nation (Center for Army LessonsLearned 148).

Thehypothesis:

Doesthe Afghan National Security Forces including Afghan Armed Forces(ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP),Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security(NDS) provide the necessary security for the population and survivalof the central government?

ResearchDesign/Methodology

Eligibledata to be used in the research study will need to be peer-reviewedresearch information conducted within the last four years inAfghanistan. In addition, the data must have credible authors anddetailed information on the methods used in information collection. The information in outlined in the research will be evaluated usingqualitative analysis strategies (Afghanistan: Country Outlook 2013).

Thesample plan will involve the collection of the security data andanalysis reports that international organizations such as the UnitedNations and the ISAF have gathered throughout the course of the war.A higher focus of the insecurity cases will be taken on informationcollected since 2011 since the ISAF have been gradually transferringthe military responsibility to the Afghanistan citizens (GAO reporton security force assistance 2013, 105-108).

Theprimary methods of collecting data for analysis will include surveys,secondary literature, interviews and archives. Although case studieswill also be used, they will be restricted to the Afghan-Soviet Warthat took place in the country between 1979 and 1989. The studies arerelevant since the conflict back then aimed at establishing apowerful government in Afghanistan that would in turn prevent thecountry from becoming a haven for extremists (Afghanistan: CountryOutlook 2013).

Althoughevery effort will be observed to avoid unnecessary bias, the resultsmight be biased since some missions conducted by the internationalforces are kept secret. Besides, the extensive damage toinfrastructure in the country prevents adequate media coverage of theinsecurity events taking place in the country. Finally, both theAfghani Army and the ISAF withhold crucial data concerning the damagethe insurgents cause to avoid causing security panic to the civilians(Mazhar, Samee and Naheed 2013, 69). The inconsistencies in datarecording and evaluation could result in inaccurate resultsconcerning the capability of the Afghanistan’s Armed Forcescapability to provide security to both the Government of NationalUnity and the civilians (Mazhar, Samee and Naheed 2013, 73).

References

Afghanistan:Country Outlook 2013.New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit.http://search.proquest.com/docview/1465064666?accountid=8289.

Centerfor Army Lessons Learned, Afghanistanprovincial reconstruction team handbook: District stability framework(CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2011), 141- 152.

Felbab-Brown,Vanda. 2015. Blood and Hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 update.Brookings,May 26.http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/26-isis-taliban-afghanistan-felbabbrown.(Accessed October 3, 2015).

GAOreport on security force assistance. 2013. Connections: The Quarterly Journal12, no. 2: 103-124,http://search.proquest.com/docview/1443263659?accountid=8289.(accessed September 21, 2015).

Grassi,Daniele. 2014. Afghanistan’s uncertain future: The new unitygovernment is a diplomatic achievement, but its future looksdecidedly shaky. TheDiplomat,September 28.http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/afghanistans-uncertain-future/. (Accessed October 3, 2015).

Javaid,Umbreen and Farhat Nasreen. 2013. Liquidation of American Forces fromAfghanistan: Its impacts on the region. SouthAsian StudiesVol 28, No. 2: 307-315,http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amprct=j&ampq=&ampesrc=s&ampsource=web&ampcd=1&ampcad=rja&ampuact=8&ampved=0CB0QFjAAahUKEwiXyKW814jIAhWJA5IKHQRpD1A&ampurl=http%3A%2F%2Fpu.edu.pk%2Fimages%2Fjournal%2Fcsas%2FPDF%2F4.%2520Dr.%2520Umbreen_v28_2_13.pdf&ampusg=AFQjCNE5P6hP8zVR57TSaVBOaGJWQGYVcA.(accessed September 21, 2015).

Khalilzad,Zalmay. 2014. A new start for Afghanistan: 3 massive challenges thatwill decide its future. The national Interest, October 20.http://nationalinterest.org/feature/new-start-afghanistan-5-massive-challenges-will-decide-its-11501?page=2.(Accessed October 3, 2015).

Masoud,Fahim. 2015. Afghanistan’s Future: Interview with Amrullah Saleh.InternationalPolicy Digest,26 August.http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/08/26/afghanistan-s-future-interview-with-amrullah-saleh/(AccessedOctober 3, 2015).

Mazhar,Muhammad Saleem, Samee Ozair Khan, and Naheed S. Goraya. 2013. Post2014-afghanistan. SouthAsian Studies28, No 1, pp 67-84,http://search.proquest.com/docview/1369670723?accountid=8289.(accessed September 21, 2015).

Storch,Thomas. 2015. Afghanistan’s precarious future. WorldAffairs Journal,April 23.http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/thomas-storch/afghanistan%E2%80%99s-precarious-future(Accessed October 3, 2015).

Waldman,Matt. “System Failure: The Underlying Causes of US Policy-MakingErrors in Afghanistan.” InternationalAffairs, Vol.89, No. 4 (July 2013), pp 825-843,https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/193087(accessedSeptember 21, 2015).